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Accounting for NGOs
Peter J. Spiro*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Non-governmental organizations have enjoyed a phenomenally rapid rise on the
world scene. Only a decade ago, few were familiar with the acronym "NGO." Today,
it is on the way to becoming one of those few short-hands that has achieved nearly
universal recognition. Although NGOs are hardly new to this era, as several recent
histories attest,' the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization have
empowered NGOs. The same developments that have dethroned the nation-state
from its centuries-long near-monopoly on international relations have worked to
enhance NGO capacities.
Among other features of globalization, the
communications revolution, the diminished threat of unrestrained armed conflict
among states, and the increasing fluidity of national boundaries have compressed the
relative powers of states and non-state actors, making the latter's rise appear all the
more dramatic. It might be a bit of an exaggeration to tag this the age of non-state
actors, but their rise is among the central features of contemporary global affairs.2
In the wake of this newfound power, commentators are coming increasingly to
question the legitimacy of NGOs and the influence they now exert at the
international level.' This response is unsurprising, given the general perception (not
Professor, Hofstra Law School. This essay was presented at the Johns Hopkins School for
Advanced International Studies, Conference on New Technologies and International Governance
(Feb 12, 2002).

1.

2.

3.

See, for example, William Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Curious
Grapevine (St Martin's 1998); Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuriesof Participation:NGOs and International
Governance, 18 MichJ Intl L 183 (1997).
Reflecting the rise of non-state actors, the academic and policy literature on NGOs has itself
exploded. For a useful annotated bibliography, see Ann M. Florini, ed, The Third Force: The Rise of
TransnationalCivil Society 241-76 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2000).
See, for example, Jeremy Rabkin, InternationalLaw vs. the American Constitution-SometbinsGot To
Give, 55 Natd Interest 30, 37 (Spring 1999) ('NGOs never have to face voters or bear any sort of
accountability."); Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of
InternationalNon-governmental Organizations and the Idea of InternationalCivil Society, 11 EurJ Intl L 91,
112-19 (2000) ("But Who Elected the International NGOs"); David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A.
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all that well founded) of NGOs as working to advance progressive agendas. For those
for whom national sovereignty has emerged as a rallying call, NGOs are now being
lumped together with faceless bureaucrats in Geneva as the bugaboos of global
governance. In this view, NGOs have mounted a sort of free-form coup against
international institutions, representing nothing more than themselves.
Those who resist the assertion of NGO power are perhaps most resistant to
their participation in formal international decisionmaking. That seems to me exactly
the wrong answer to the NGO challenge. Wherever power is exercised, questions of
accountability are appropriately posed.4 One can never assume that power will be
deployed in a responsible manner; indeed, where power-shifts have not yet been
reflected in the decisionmaking architecture, one can assume the opportunity for
abuse. NGOs now garner power independent of states and other entities;
international law and international institutions, however, are still largely premised on
a world in which states have the last word. Some who question NGO legitimacy
would simply wish a return to the old world in which states aggregately held most
associational power. That would, indeed, take care of the issue of NGO
accountability. But that seems an unrealistic response. Insofar as NGO power is
beyond the control of states and their intergovernmental creatures, it cannot be
reversed by the policymakers.
Rather, in what might be called the inclusion paradox, the accountability
challenge may be better answered by formally and fully recognizing NGO power in
international institutional architectures. Formal NGO participation in international
decisionmaking would have the effect of outing NGO power and advancing a
transparency objective. It would also hold NGOs, as repeat players, accountable to
institutional bargains. NGOs now participate in international negotiations in
hallways or through state surrogates. But because their participation is informal, they
are free subsequently to reject results not to their liking. That threatens to keep the
international lawmaking process unstable at a crucial juncture in its evolution.

4.

Casey, The Rocky Shoals of International Law, 62 Natl Interest 35, 37 (2000-01) ('NGOs are not
elected, not accountable to any body politic:'); John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The
Globalization Backlash, Foreign Pol 16, 24 (Sept/Oct 2001) ("NGOs claim to represent global civil
society. But nobody elects them:').
See Peter J. Spiro, New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International DecisionMaking Institutions, 18 Wash Q 45 (Winter 1995); Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates:
Nongovernmental Organizationsand the "Unregulated"Marketplace, 18 Cardozo L Rev 957 (1996).
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II. UNPACKING ACCOUNTABILITY: To CONSTITUENCIES AND TO
PROCESS

The accountability card often conflates two types of accountability: internal and
external. Internal accountability confronts the agency problem of representation of
memberships by a necessarily limited numbers of leaders. External accountability
addresses the responsiveness of organizations to larger systems of which they are a
part. As deployed against NGOs, the first problem is exaggerated, and the second is
better answered by elevating, not suppressing, the status of NGOs in the international
context.
A. INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY
There is no doubt that NGO staffs have wide discretion in representing their
members or other less formal constituencies, in many cases wider than that enjoyed by
governmental representatives. In the category of membership organizations, with a
few notable exceptions (Amnesty International and the Sierra Club among them), the
leaderships of most NGOs are not formally elected or otherwise directly answerable
to individual members. The vast majority of such individual members, safe to say, are
passive, with a material commitment that may not exceed nominal annual dues.
Individual members are unlikely to monitor complete organizational agendas; insofar
as they do engage in such monitoring, they are unlikely to take NGO leaderships to
task on particular issues. NGO executive directorates have membership dues and
other funds at their disposal, with few strings attached, and can claim to speak for
thousands, sometimes millions, of members who, as a practical matter, exercise little
scrutiny of their representatives. The problem may be aggravated in the context of
non-membership organizations whose staffs more neatly fit the "free agent
description, arguably advancing no agenda beyond their own.
But these problematizations of internal NGO accountability seem unable to
address at least two possible objections. First, they discount the possibility of
competition among NGOs as a form of discipline. Unlike citizens vis-a-vis states, the
costs of exit for members of NGOs are relatively low. No NGO (at least as defined
as an advocacy group) has a monopoly in any particular issue context. Assuming some
basic level of monitoring, now often facilitated by the mainstream media, one can
simply let a membership lapse in the wake of a disagreement with an NGO's policy or
tactics, and turn those dollars or other forms of commitment over to another group
instead.5 If nothing else, a group that is ineffective or unresponsive will lose members
and other sources of support; in no model where choice is available will a loser sustain
5.

See, for example, Mois~s Naim, Lori's War, Foreign Pol 28, 39 (Spring 2000) (quoting Public
Citizen executive director Lori Wallach, "[t]he times that we've gone off on issues that they
[members] didnt find important or valuable, they stopped being members").
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support over the long-term. It is true that some groups (Amnesty International and
Greenpeace, for example) have achieved something approaching primacy in their
areas, to the point that market failure becomes a risk. But even Amnesty
International and Greenpeace do not have free rein. Amnesty International's
leadership is checked by a strict internal governance structure, which appears to have
minimized internal organization difficulties.6 Greenpeace, by contrast, has suffered
periods of internal strife,' which demonstrates that members do pay attention when it
comes to the broader policy orientation of an NGO behemoth. Non-member groups
are kept on a tighter leash by sophisticated funders (especially foundations), nor can
they wave around membership rolls by way of attempting to enhance their influence.
If a non-membership group does not show results or follow a funder's directive,
discipline can be swift and effective.
The second response to charges of internal unaccountability highlights the
fetishization of other forms of associations. In this context the democratic state is
implicitly idealized on the accountability metric, especially by virtue of periodic
elections. But accountability is a relative, not an absolute, quantity, and the franchise
is itself a crude tool for keeping governmental authorities in line. This is true even in
the legislative context, where multiple issues will afford representatives wide
discretion, even against collective constituent preferences. (Of course, it may be more
difficult to buck the interests of financial contributors, but that feature of modem
democracy is rarely held up as a systemic virtue.) This phenomenon is more
characteristic of the foreign policy realm. Here, the relevant decisionmaker is typically
the executive branch. Particular foreign policy decisions, on anything but the most
grave issues of national security, are unlikely to be scrutinized by the average voter
(leaving aside the large numbers who do not bother to vote at all). Only a tiny
minority will be aware of governmental positions in fora such as the Convention on
the Law of the Sea, Commission on Sustainable Development, or the Human Rights
Committee, much less determine their votes on that basis. Governments can get away
with an awful lot before having to answer to their memberships, and yet of course that
has supplied no argument against their participation in international institutions.!

6.
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Not that Amnesty International has not witnessed deep internal divisions, as was the case with
respect to advocating rights based on sexual orientation. See James D. Wilets, International Human
Rights Law and Sexual Orientation, 18 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 1, 72 (1994) (describing
controversy surrounding interpretation of the group's mandate to include those imprisoned on the
basis of sexual orientation as "prisoners of conscience"). But these disagreements have been
institutionally channeled so as to minimize organizational disruption.
See Anastasia Toufexis, It's Not Easy Being Greenpeace, Time 86 (Oct 16, 1995) (describing conflict
between "old-line 'radicals" who favored confrontational tactics and "new-style 'suits" who were
willing to consider cooperating with multinational corporations and states).
Even today, of course, democracy is not a precondition for international recognition in the context of
governments. That makes the idealization of state accountability more stark. Iraq's seat in the
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Indeed, insofar as NGOs tend to be focused on a limited set of issues, their
members will be in a better position to monitor and discipline leaderships than are
voters with respect to governmental representation. Unlike in the NGO context, the
costs of exit from states are quite high. 9 Assume that both Democrats and
Republicans (who have together effectively captured the governance market in the
United States, and have long foreclosed the efficacy of third parties) have the same
position on a particular global policy issue. A US citizen might in theory be able to
change her citizenship in disagreement, but such a response would be improbable.
The contrast to NGOs is clear. 0
NGOs are perhaps more appropriately compared to corporations for
accountability purposes. (Of course, corporations are also non-state actors, with
recently unleashed international capacities.) In the corporate context, shareholders
play the role of NGO members; shareholders may control the corporation as a formal
matter, but as a practical one, they are often powerless (in the face of high monitoring
costs and collective action problems) to control directors and management. That is
not to say, however, that corporations are unaccountable. In most cases shareholders
enjoy the exit options of selling their shares, in rather the same way that NGO
members can decline to renew their memberships. Accountability and agency
problems are central to corporate law, but are confronted as a challenge amenable to at
least incremental amelioration. One does not argue against the legitimacy of
corporations vet non because the agency puzzles will never be fully solved. That should
inform a similar orientation with respect to the internal accountability of NGOs.
There is surely room for enhancing the discipline of NGO representatives, made all
the more important in the wake of their new global prominence. In the end, however,
this is a question of international not-for-profit law. It may be more than technical,
and will in fact require creative thinking, parallel to the demands globalization poses in

9.

United Nations and other international organizations offers an easy first response to accountability
arguments against NGO participation in international decisionmaking.
And entrance is often involuntary, insofar as most individuals acquire citizenship by birth. Leaving
aside NGOs purporting to represent ascriptive groups exclusively (as in the case of indigenous
peoples), see Benedict Kingsbury, First Amendment Liberalism as Global Legal Arcbitecture Ascriptive

Groups and the Problems of the Liberal NGO Model of International Civil Society, 3 ChiJ Intl L 183 (2002),
10.

membership in NGOs is more typically the result of individual choice.
This line of reasoning also explains in part the source of NGO power. NGOs represent an alternate
channel of representation for dissenters from governmental positions. Even assuming perfect
democratic representation by governments, minority elements may be left without a voice at the
international level. In this respect, NGOs are part of the answer to another accountability
problem-that of governments. NGOs supply issue-specific, partial exit options for individuals for
purposes of global policy that will help discipline governments through a mechanism other than the
ballot box.
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the corporate law context. But there is no strong argument here against NGO
participation in international institutions.
B. EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Issues of external accountability are more submerged and challenging, insofar as
they are usually taken as prior. The question here is how to keep NGOs accountable
to the system in which they are exercising power. Before the end of the Cold War and
the advent of globalization, NGOs worked through states and had little independent
influence; in that context, there was no need to address the issue. Today, the problem
is potentially serious. NGOs are significant, independent players in the global system,
and yet the system does not recognize them as such. As a result, NGOs comprise a
potentially destabilizing force. They can use the system to advance their agendas, but
are not answerable to the system. They can bring others to task, but themselves
remain immune. NGOs have not been held responsible for their conduct; they
cannot violate international law or agreements. That was fine as long as NGOs
remained under the control of another entity who was held responsible for their
conduct-namely, the state-but as that control has eroded, NGOs have been able
to play the role of policy potentates. NGOs participate in international standardsetting in institutional settings, by influencing state parties to formal negotiations, in
some cases through delegation capture. At environmental negotiations, Greenpeace
and other powerful NGOs pull more influence than do many states. This
participation is rarely formal, or at least formal participation is subordinated,
consistent with traditional conceptions of international law under which NGOs have
no legal personality.
This lack of standing can work to NGO advantage. Because the participation in
international decisionmaking is informal, NGOs have no obligation to respect
decisionmaking results. They first work inside the halls of power, securing what they
can in formal and institutionalized results (conventions, for example). What they
don't get on the inside, however, they can try to secure through other means, rejecting
those elements of institutional bargains not to their liking. Insofar as NGOs garner
independent power, that rejection can be consequential. By mobilizing consumer
constituencies, most notably, NGOs can set regulatory-like standards even where
formal regulation would be beyond reach. They enjoy many of the advantages of
participation rights without the downside of having to abide by agreements that will
inevitably reflect compromise and other interests.'
This leads to what might be called the inclusion paradox. States resist enhancing
the formal status of non-state actors in international decisionmaking for fear that it
will further fuel the rise of NGOs and threaten the monopoly of states over
11.

For more discussion, see Spiro, 18 Cardozo L Rev at 962-63 (cited in note 4).
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international lawmaking. But the formal inclusion of non-state actors in international
decisionmaking might act more as a restraint on NGO power than an accelerant.
Major NGO players already effectively have a seat at the table. Formal and direct
participation would not add much to their influence, but it would increase their
external accountability. No longer could NGOs opt out of bargains to which they
had attached their names. As ongoing institutional participants, they would have a
greater incentive to facilitate institutional success. Advocacy groups would no longer
be able to launder their influence through pliant front-states or backroom lobbying.
In that respect, formal inclusion would also enhance transparency, as well as
accountability, among NGOs. Major NGO players would have to answer to their
lesser counterparts were they to enjoy rights to represent broad non-state interests in
international decisionmaking.
As a matter of international legal doctrine, the upshot would be formal legal
personality for non-state actors, with the rights and responsibilities that such status
entails. Rights would apply primarily in matters of participation. The modalities
here may be complex and institutionally variable. Selecting participants from among a
potentially infinite number of eligible NGOs would present one notable question. In
some contexts that challenge appears to have been overcome, for instance, in
composing 'liaison" committees between non-state and governmental forums at the
world summits on women, population and development, human rights, and other
subjects. The International Labor Organization, in which employers and unions are
directly represented along with states, demonstrates the efficacy of formal non-state
participation. Waystation possibilities include advisory committees, as already
innovated by the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development. In judicial-type tribunals, standing to bring suit and to participate in
amicus capacities present logical end-points. Here the domestic models translate
more easily, as gate-keeping is more easily undertaken. The European Court of
Justice now accepts NGO submissions, and NGO amicus participation in the World
Trade Organization appears inevitable.
On the responsibilities side, one could begin to speak of international law
violations by entities other than states. Symmetrical to rights of participation would
be obligations to respect negotiated results. In most cases, it would be difficult to
speak of NGO "compliance," insofar as NGO conduct is typically not the object of
regulatory regimes. Amnesty International, for example, is itself not the target of
human rights norms; it is not the sort of organization that can engage in torture,
undertake detentions, or suppress public speech.' 2 But NGOs could nonetheless be

12.

One can imagine some norms that would be entity-applicable to NGOs; for instance, nondiscrimination principles with respect to membership. Corporations, of course, comprise a category
of non-state actor which would lend itself to such compliance models. This is clearly the case in the
environmental context, where corporations are typically the ultimate object of regulation. There
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meaningfily held to the bargains that they have entered into in standard-setting
processes, so that they could not undertake extra-institutional action to undermine
such bargains. If formally accountable to the process, Greenpeace could not launch a
boycott seeking to advance protective standards different from those negotiated
among relevant international actors (corporations included). In this respect, formal
recognition of NGOs would enhance their external accountability.

III.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND PROCESS STABILITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW

External accountability is already being innovated outside of public international
institutions. Advocacy NGOs and transnational corporations have been negotiating
agreements to govern corporate conduct on such issues as labor rights and
environmental protection. Some of these agreements are being elaborated into refined
codes of conduct, complete with comprehensive monitoring schemes. For big
corporations, these arrangements are "voluntary" in name only, and the standards they
set are beginning to look like law. Corporations participate because such schemes
insure the external accountability of the counterpart NGOs and enhance regime
certainty. NGOs participate because it gives them unmediated power. 3
But the code of conduct model poses its own set of accountability concerns.
NGO representation and relations between the various actors will be more difficult to
monitor than in a public institutional process. The North-South divide among
NGOs may be less vigilantly confronted (with deals struck between NGO executive
directors and their corporate CEO Manhattan neighbors, with no voice from the
developing world). The risk of conflicts of interest is also magnified in the private
sphere. How, for instance, will those regimes police corporate contributions to their
supposed NGO guardians? In these early stages, some of these problems can be
mitigated through a form of competition among private codes, as is now occurring in
the labor rights context. 4 In the long run, however, the barriers to entry will be

13.

14.

have also been recent developments suggesting the application of human rights norms to corporate
actors. See generally Steven R. Ratner, Corporationsand Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility,
111 Yale LJ 443 (2001).
On codes of conduct, see, for example, Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the
Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 Ind J Global Legal Stud 401
(2001); Ratner, 111 Yale L J at 531-36 (cited in note 12). On global governance beyond public
institutions generally, see, for example, A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter, eds,
PrivateAuthority and InternationalAffairs (SUNY 1999).
The currency of this competition is in the number and importance of adherents to particular codes.
In the labor context (involving codes of conduct on such issues as child labor, minimum wages, and
working conditions), the frontrunner codes are operated on the one hand by the Fair Labor
Association, which claims the support of many major apparel manufacturers and prominent human
rights organizations (such as the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and Human Rights
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formidable for initiating new regimes, and this check will be effective only against
sustained misfeasance.
Hence the possible virtues of migrating such standard-setting to public
institutions. Public institutions focus attention, are more likely to achieve universality
of coverage, should facilitate monitoring and enforcement, and are ultimately more
likely to promote the legitimacy of international law. Enhanced NGO participation is
a necessary condition to the stability of standards established in public institutional
contexts. Of course, one could not force NGOs to participate. But if major
institutions extended meaningful formal channels for participation, there would be
powerful competitive incentives (in terms of attracting members and funding) for
particular NGOs to sign on.
This leaves us with an answer that transcends the question posed here. The
formal inclusion of non-state actors in institutional decisionmaking will not only
advance the accountability of NGOs to the system but will also advance the system
itself. Non-state power is a fact of the new world. International law will need to be
accountable to that power if it is to emerge as the governor of global affairs into the
future.

Watch); on the other, by the Worker Rights Consortium, backed by unions and many prominent
American educational institutions. See, for example, Steven Greenhouse, Banishing the Dickensian
Factor, NY Times § 4 at 5 (July 9, 2000) (describing competing private initiatives for combating
sweatshop labor). See also Gary Gereffi, Ronie Garcia-Johnson, and Erika Sasser, The NGOIndustrialComplex, Foreign Pol 56 (July/Aug 2001) (describing other certification schemes).
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